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Leveraged Buyouts in the Late Eighties:
How Bad Were They?
Abstract
This study investig~tes the performance of 47 large LBOs that were completed in the
1987-90 period. We find that these LBOs were not devastated in the 1990-91 recession and
that banks did not experience large losses in the recession due to HLT lending. In fact,
cash flow increased by 9.8 percent after adjustment for industry trends in the average
LBO in our sample. While 28 percent of firms examined in this study experienced
financial distress, the majority of firms have reissued publicly-held equity, allowing LBO
investors to cash out. In addition, a number of firms which did experience financial
distress, experienced subsequent rebounds in operating performance and are now
successful in their markets.

1.

Introduction

The 1980s saw the spectacular rise and fall of the leveraged buyout. While leveraged
buyouts (referred to as LBOs) have been widely criticized for plundering the assets of
healthy businesses, ·separate studies by Kaplan (1990) and Smith (1991) indicate that
leveraged buyouts taking place between 1977 and 1986 significantly improved operating
efficiency. Moreover, LBOs in this period had a relatively small impact on employment,
research and development and maintenance expenses. This suggests that LBOs were
good for the companies involved and, most likely, good for the economy as a whole.
With the dramatic rise in junk bond defaults in 1989-1991, many of which were
related to unsuccessful LBOs, perceptions of the cohort of LBOs that were completed
between 1987 and 1990 turned decidedly negative. The later LBOs may have been
overpriced as potential acquirers outbid each other for the chance to earn fees and a slice
of buyout profits (Kaplan and Stein (1993)). Or, the best LBOs may have already been
completed by 1987 and the only remaining targets offered small or nonexistent gains
from going private.

The quality of LBO transactions may have slipped because

inexperienced buyers entered the market to reap the profits earlier investors had
reported, but such johnny-come-lately participants lacked the expertise to successfully
carry out a leveraged buyout.

Martin Fridson (1991) argues that agency problems

between the dealmakers and their investors led to numerous negative net present value
LBOs in the late 1980s.
This study documents change in operating performance following 47 of the largest
leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990. This study extends the earlier work
of Opler (1992) who analyzed a similar sample. The principal change is the sample now
focuses on LBOs that took place after 1987 rather than those taking place after 1985.
1

Besides adding later deals, financial performance results through mid-1993 have been
incorporated in order to document the effects of the 1991-92 recession on LBO
performance.
Despite the ,increased rate of financial distress, the evidence presented here
suggests that leveraged buyouts continued to create value, on balance, throughout the
late 1980s. Our main findings are:

e

Cash flow I sales rose by 4.2%, from one year before the median sample LBO until
two years afterwards. After adjustment for industry trends, the median growth
rate of cash flow to sales was 9.8 percent.

e

Many of the firms in the sample were sufficiently successful to attract new equity
through initial public offerings or for other public companies to acquire them.
More than half of the LBOs in the sample return to public ownership within four
years of being taken private, largely through initial public offerings. The rate of
reversion to public status compares favorably with the experience of earlier LBOs
examined by Kaplan (1991 ).

e

Approximately 28 percent of the LBOs in the sample filed for Chapter 11 or
defaulted on their debt payments by early 1993. While more common than in
earlier LBOs, financial distress was the exception, not the rule in the LBOs of the
late 1980s. Moreover, some of the firms that experienced financial distress
eventually emerged as viable public companies. Thus, default and bankruptcy
did not necessarily lead to the demise of such LBOs.

e

Concerns of widespread distress among financial institutions that lent to LBOs
turned out to been overly pessimistic. Banks have charged off relatively few of
their LBO loans, and the exposure of the largest banks is small in relation to their
total assets.

e

Research and development spending fell after LBOs of the late 1980s. But
because so few buyout targets had significant R&D spending, the decline is
economically insignificant.

In sum, these findings indicate that LBOs in the 1987-90 period experienced operating
improvements that were similar to those following earlier deals. While conclusions about
change in operating performance following LBOs will depend on the sample and the
performance measures used, our results suggest that LBOs of the late 1980s, like their
earlier counterparts, produced substantial operating improvements and had a reasonable
2

chance of success.
The observed operating improvements are also substantially larger than those
observed in another study of LBOs of the late 1980s undertaken by Long and Ravenscraft
(1993). Long and Ravenscraft find that the LBOs of 1986 and 1987 actually experienced
declines in performance. Differences between their results and those obtained here may
owe to differences in the samples examined. Specifically, they included many smaller
deals and also used an unusual source of financial data to observe changes in financial
values after LBOs.

2.

Performance measurement and sample

2.1

Sample

This study documents change in operating performance following 47 of the largest
leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990. All but one of the twenty largest
LBOs completed during this period are included in the study.1 The sample includes all
firms that 1) went private in an LBO listed by Forbes in its 1988-1991 "400 Largest Private
U.S. Firms" and 2) had sufficient public data to measure pre- and post-LBO operating
performance. Because these large LBOs have the most impact on the economy they are
naturally of great interest.

Definition of operating performance

2.2

The main measure of operating performance used in this study is the operating profit
margin, as reported in corporate annual reports and COMPUSTAT. This is defined as

1

Montgomery Wards is not examined because pre-buyout financials are unavailable.
3

operating income, or net sales minus cost of goods sold and selling, general and
administrative expenses (EBITDA), divided by sales. This measures cash flow before
depreciation, interest and taxes. The benefit of using this cash flow measure is that
accounting changes. resulting from a leveraged buyout are minimized.2 Using this
measure may also understate operating improvements insofar as LBOs may improve
firm's asset utilization measured by the sales/assets ratio.

3.

Changes in performance after LBOs

3.1

Impact of LBOs on the profit margin

Table 1 shows the change in operating performance for the 47 LBOs in the sample one
year and two years after the buyout. The median change in profitability is shown for
two time frames (year -1 to +1 and year -1 to +2).3 Operating cash flow to sales typically
rose by 4.2 percent from one year before until two years afterwards. After adjustment
for industry trends, the median change in operating profit margin was 9.8 percent by the
second post-LBO year. This indicates that most LBOs of the late 1980s were followed by
operating improvements relative to other firms in the economy.
Table 2 shows the individual firms in the sample and the percentage change in
their profitability from one year before until one year after deal completion. The firms
are ordered by the year of their LBO and by growth rate within each cohort year. The

ln addition, by looking at accounting changes relative to sales instead of assets
means that the effects of asset write-ups on observed performance are minimized.
2

Results for short horizon time frames (one and two years) also appear to hold over
longer periods. Profitability grew by four percent among the 19 firms in this study for
which profitability numbers were available four years after the buyout. This suggests
that improved profit margins in LBOs are often permanent.
3

4

results for the individual firms in Table 2 exhibit sizeable variance. Some firms such as
Joy Technologies and International Controls did very well in the first year after being
taken private, while others such as Dyncorp, Edgcomb, and 1WA ran into serious
operating difficulti~. About two-thirds of the companies in Table 2 increased their profit
margins in the first post-buyout year, and nearly half raised their profit margins by 10
percent or more. Adjusting for industry performance affects the magnitude of the profits
considerably but generally does not change the qualitative results-- firms that did poorly
in an absolute sense tended to do poorly compared to their competitors too. The growth
rates are fairly similar across the year cohorts, suggesting that there was no trend in
profit margin gains over time.
Some of the companies that did very well in their first post-buyout year, such as
Best Products and Insilco, eventually ended up in bankruptcy, while others that started
out poorly, such as Arkansas Best and Horace Mann Educators, never experienced
financial distress and successfully completed IPOs. An obvious explanation for this result
is that LBOs that filed for bankruptcy did not become as profitable as the LBO sponsors
had envisioned when they determined the offer price for the target and the new capital
structure. In contrast, firms that did poorly in their first year may have had ample
buffers for bad years built into the LBO plans.

3.2.

Impact of LBOs on research and development

Critics of leveraged buyouts argue that they cause firms to focus on short-term
performance and ignore valuable long-term investments in research and development.
Past studies (e.g. those of Kaplan and. Smith) have found that few LBO firms engage in
significant R&D spending. Similarly, most firms in this study do not report R&D
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expenses because it is negligible relative to sales. Of the 47 firms examined in this study,
only nine reported any R&D expenses at all. Among these firms, R&D expenditures fell
by a total of $30 million from one year before until one year after the buyout. This
decline is small, but .because buyout targets have such low R&D to begin with, it is large
in percentage terms. The median ratio of R&D expense to sales of the nine firms with
any R&D spending fell by 20.5 percent - a statistically insignificant amount given the
sample size.

4.

The financial health of the late-1980s LBOs

4.1.

Outcomes as a measure of transaction success

While most of the LBOs in our sample experienced improved profit margins, the success
of an LBO must also be measured in terms of how well the firm compared to the
expectations of the LBO investors. The pattern of improving operating earnings shown
above indicates that late 1980s LBO targets did offer gains from going public and that the
sponsors has sufficient knowledge, on balance, to tap hidden profits. This evidence says
little, however, about whether later stage LBOs were overpriced or whether less
experienced LBO investors were able to design the appropriate capital structure for their
acquisitions. From the equity investors' point of view, an LBO is only successful when
profit margins are sufficient to pay off the bondholders and offer a reasonable return on
the equity investment.
There are essentially three paths that an LBO can follow upon going private: 1)
the company can remain private and continue to service its debt; 2) the investors can
cash out or increase the liquidity of their equity stake through an initial public offering
or sale to another investor; or 3) the debt will overwhelm the cash flow of the firm,
6

leading to default and possibly bankruptcy. Because of the scarcity of data on the value
of the equity investments in LBOs, little is revealed about the relative value of an LBO
that follows the first path. LBOs that take the two last paths, however, provide more
information about "Yhether the LBO met the sponsors' goals. In the case of default, the
equity is usually worthless and bondholders become the new owners of the firm. Thus,
default and bankruptcy are clear indicators that an LBO failed to meet expectations.
Initial public offerings, likewise, are a clear signal of positive returns to the equityholders
in the LBO. An LBO investor will only pursue an IPO if the expected price of the shares
in the public stock market is high enough to realize a strong gain. Otherwise, the LBO
investor will refrain from attempting an IPO until the return becomes more attractive.
In this section, we document the number of firms in the sample that encountered
financial distress and the number that were able to return to public status. These two
indicators are measures of the success of the LBOs in the eyes of the equity investors in
the LBOs.

4.2.

Financial Distress

While we know the number of distressed firms is greater than in the early 1980s (there
were almost no large LBOs that defaulted before 1987), just how common was the
incidence of default? Table 3 lists the firms that encountered financial distress after going
private and those that did not. We define financial distress as default on a bond or
bankruptcy. Just under 28 percent of the sample experienced financial distress, a large
fraction by historical standards but not so large as to seriously question the ex ante
profitability of the late 1980s LBOs.
All but one of the financially distressed firms encountered problems after the
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economy slowed in 1989. The fact that highly leveraged firms in the late 1980s defaulted
more frequently than their counterparts earlier in the decade may reflect the fact that the
later cohort was more exposed to the business cycle and more prone to misforecasting
future revenue streams.

4.3.

Tapping the !PO market

The initial public offerings market has been particularly active since the Spring of 1991,
making for an environment in which investors have been quite receptive to reverse LBOs.
Table 4 shows that many firms which went private in the 1987-90 period have since
returned to public ownership. Indeed, 28 of the 47 firms are now public again, of which
19 completed initial public offerings. The remaining 9 firms were either acquired by
public companies (5) or issued stock to their bondholders after emerging from
bankruptcy (4).
This experience compares favorably to that of earlier LBOs reported by Kaplan
(1991). Both the firms in Kaplan's sample and our sample encountered a receptive IPO
market within a few years of going private (Kaplan's LBOs experienced hot IPO markets
in 1983 and 1986-1987). In Kaplan's sample, 38 percent of firms undertaking LBOs
betWeen 1979 and 1986 had gone public (or were purchased by public companies) by
1991 . In contrast, fully 60 percent of the LBOs in our sample return to public status by
mid-1993. The firms in our sample were more likely to return to public ownership than
those in Kaplan's sample, despite a shorter average timespan since going private.
Another way to compare the two samples is to compare the hazard rate of
returning to public ownership or the cumulative survival rate of remaining private. The
hazard rate, shown in Table 5, is the number of firms (n) that return to public ownership
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after x years of remaining private divided by the number of firms that could possibly
have returned to public status that many years after the LBO (R). The latter concept, R,
is also called the "risk set" and in this sample includes all the LBOs that have existed long
enough to be in the· set and have not yet gone public. For example, an LBO that was
completed in 1990 and is still private is not in the risk set for year 5 because 5 years have
not elapsed since the LBO. The cumulative survival rate is the percentage of firms that
are still private x years after the LBO.
Table 5 shows that most of the firms in the sample went public - the cumulative
survival rate is only 27 percent by year 6. The table also indicates that they returned to
public ownership rather quickly - the hazard rate, n/R, is close to 20 percent in years
2 through 4. Kaplan (1991) presents similar data on the hazard rates and cumulative
survival rates for earlier LBOs. The hazard rate for Kaplan's sample never rises above
14 percent in any given year. Four years from the date of the LBO, 62 percent of the
Kaplan sample is still private, whereas only 49 percent of our sample is still private.
Within 6 years of going private over 70 percent of the late 1980s LBOs have returned to
public ownership, while less than half of Kaplan's earlier LBOs had done so within 6
years.
Interestingly, several firms which encountered financial distress also eventually
went public or were purchased by third parties (e.g. Charter Medical, Edgcomb, Revco
and Southland). This experience is consistent with the view that financial distress, while
costly, need not permantly damage firms' business prospects. Consider, for example, the
case of Charter Medical, an operator of psychiatric and general hospitals, was taken
private in a $1.6 billion management-led buyout in September 1988.
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4.4

Bankruptcy need not be fatal: The case of Charter Medical
Over the five years prior to its 1988 LBO, Charter Medical's net psychiatric

revenues grew at an annual compound rate of 36 percent. With expectations of further
strong growth in its. industry, Charter Medical continued to build psychiatric hospitals
after the buyout, expanding its stock from 68 in 1988 to 89 by 1991. A severe decline in
Medicare expenditures on mental health and substance abuse programs, however,
combined with increasing corporate efforts to trim escalating health insurance premia,
led to a 10 percent drop in occupancy rates and shorter average stays in its psychiatric
hospitals in 1990. Consequently, EBITDA fell from over $280 million in 1989 to only $113
million in 1990. In February 1991, the company defaulted on its debt obligations and
began asset sales to maintain liquidity. Charter Medical filed a prepackaged bankruptcy
plan in June 1992, which was confirmed a month later.

Since then, EBITDA has

rebounded to $280 million (annualized), despite a reduction in the number of psychiatric
hospitals. While the LBO clearly fell short of the mark, profit margins have increased
sharply since the buyout and the market value of Charter Medical today is fairly close
to the price paid for the company in 1988, despite an industry-wide decline in demand.
Thus, even this LBO that ended up in bankruptcy appears not have been a complete
failure.

5.

Did LBOs destabilize the financial system?

Many observers have expressed concern that the high levels of debt incurred in the LBOs
of the late 1980s could cause a series of defaults that would seriously undermine the
stability of the financial system (Bemanke, Campbell and Whited (1989), Friedman (1989),
Greenspan (1991) and Reich (1989)). These worries prompted regulators to require banks
10

to separately classify loans made in leveraged buyouts as highly leveraged transaction
(HLT) loans. The recession of 1990-1991 has now tested concerns about the destabilizing
effects of leveraged buyouts. Contrary to well-publicized predictions, problems in major
bank's HLT portfoli<?S have not prompted financial instability. One of the reasons for this
experience becomes clear in Table 6. The table summarizes the HLT loan exposure of the
largest U.S. banks as of December 31, 1991 (the last year in which HLT exposure was
required). Many major banks such as Citicorp and Chemical carried large dollar amounts
of HLT loans ($3.7 and $5.5 billion, respectively). But, on average, the major banks had
only 3.11% of their assets in HLT loans. Banks list the amount of loans with some
delayed payments as non-performing. The average major bank listed 10.59% of its HLT
loans as non-performing at the end of 1991. Clearly, most of the money lent by banks
in LBOs has been repaid on schedule. Many non-performing loans continued to be
partly paid off or rescheduled. Thus, relatively few HLT loans have been charged off.4
The average amount of HLT debt charged off in 1991 was fairly low-slightly over three
percent. Contrary to fears expressed by some, this indicates that the banking system did
not suffer greatly from lending in leveraged buyouts. Given the high fees and interest
charged in many LBO loans, it appears that many banks may have made profits on their
HLT portfolios.5

Many major banks have Charge-Off Committees to determine when to undertake
charge-offs. Typically charge-offs are taken when a loan has a probability of repayment
less than 50% or when it is sold at a discount to another investor.
4

banks typically do not disdose the profitability of their loan positions several
institutions reported making a profit on their HLT portfolios (e.g. Security Pacific, PNC
and Mellon Bank Corp) in 1991 annual reports. This experience is consistent with
banker's reluctance to view their HLT portfolios as major problem areas (Bleakley (1991)).
5While

11

Impact of the 1990-91 recession on LBOs

6.

Finns with high leverage are especially vulnerable to economic downturns because of the
possible adverse consequences of financial distress. Existing studies suggest that financial
distress can be very costly for some firms (Altman (1983), Lang and Stulz (1992) and
Opler and Titman (1993)). Some suggest that LBO firms will have problems with
stakeholders such as employers and customers when financial troubles mount (Fox and
Marcus (1992)). These possible costs of financial distress may mean that firms which
have the misfortune of undertaking an LBO shortly before a recession will perform
particularly poorly.6 This argument can be tested by comparing the performance of LBOs
completed in 1989 with earlier LBOs in the sample. Firms that went private in 1989 bore
the brunt of the recession in their second LBO outyear (1991 ). The median growth in the
operating margin of the 12 firms in the 1989 cohort was 4.4 percent (year -1 to year +2).
The growth rate for the 29 firms that went private in 1987 or 1988 was essentially the
same - 4.2 percent. This suggests that last recession did not exact a heavy toll on
operating performance as was feared.

Conclusion

7.

This study investigates the performance of 47large LBOs that were completed at the end
of the 1980s. We find that these LBOs were not devastated in the 1990-91 recession and
that banks d id not experience large losses in the recession due to HLT lending. In fact,
cash flow increased by 9.8 percent after adjustment for industry trends in the average

Jensen (1989) has argued that financial methods used to finance LBOs such as LBO
sponsors and strip financing may reduce the costs of financial distress in these
transactions.
6
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LBO in our sample. All told, the LBOs examined in this study were followed by increases
in operating cash flow of approximately $800 million, suggesting that these transactions
yielded significant efficiency gains for investors. The strong operating improvements at
firms taken private l;:lter in the 1980s is evidence against two theories of the ''bad cohort"
- the idea that all the good targets were already taken private and the theory that later
participants in the buyout market were lacking the expertise of LBO pioneers. It does
appear, however, that many later deals were overpriced relative to pre-LBO cash flows
(Kaplan and Stein (1993)).
This improvement in operating profits is comparable to that observed in samples
of earlier LBOs. Kaplan (1990), for example, finds that operating cash flow to sales rises
by 11.9 percent in the two years after 34 LBOs from the 1980-86 period. Similar rises in
operating cash flow have been documented by Kitching (1989), Muscarella and
Vetsuypens (1990), Smith (1991) and Kaplan and Stein (1993). The improvement of 4.2
percent in raw profitability observed in this study is somewhat lower than that observed
in these earlier studies. However, the improvement observed after industry adjustment
is comparable to previous findings.

This suggests that the somewhat weaker

performance observed after later LBOs reflects the slowdown in the economy. Overall,
the results in this study suggest that later LBOs did not result in smaller efficiency gains.
This pattern is not consistent with the argument that changes in the LBO market after
1986 dried up the supply of profitable LBO opportunities.
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Table 1
Impact of LBOs completed in the 1987-1990 period on profit margins. The profit margin is
income before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by sales. Changes are
shown relative to the date of the leveraged buyout (year 0).

Year -1 to Year +1

Year -1 to Year +2

Median Change

7.3%

4.2%

Median Industry-Adjusted Change

3.4%

9.8%

47

41

Number of LBOs

14

Table 2
Change in profit margin from one year prior until one year after LBO. The profit margin is income before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by sales. Adjusted growth in margin is the growth
in margin less the median 3-digit industry growth in margin over the same period.

Firm
Southland
Revco Drug Stores
Burlington Industries
Tracor
Pay N Pak
Borg Warner
Owens-Illinois
International Controls
Joy Technologies
DynCorp
TWA
Stop & Shop
Tops Markets
Arkansas Best
Food maker
Essex Group
Fort Howard Co
Harvard Industries
American Standard
AFG Industries
Payless Cashways
Bell & Howell
Charter Medical
Supermarkets General
Musicland Stores
Hillsborough Holdings
Florida Steel
Insilco Corp
IBC Holdings
Farm Fresh
York Holdings
Best Products
Edgcomb
NWA
Alco Health Services
Silgan Holdings
Horace Mann Educators
Mayfair Supermarket
Hospital Corp of America
RJR/Nabisco
Chicago & Northwestern
Super Rite Foods
Cullum Cos
Envirodyne Industries
Kash n' Karry
Gulfstream Aerospace

Year of
LBO
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990

Sales
(millions)
$8,348
$2,490
$2,043
NA
$498
$2,340
$3,647
$693
$553
$717
$4,606
$4,990
$1,150
$849
$1,119
$992
$1,151
$758
$3,637
$584
$2,226
$612
$1,285
$6,298
$836
$1,226
$534
$767
$1,093
$735
$1,449
$2,095
$270
$3,430
$2,564
$658
$629
$506
$4,631
$13,879
$961
$415
$1,100
$516
$1,039
$824
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3-digit
SIC Code
541
591
220
372
521
738
322
371
353
874
451
541
541
421
581
335
262
323
343
321
521
357
806
541
573
308
331
358
519
541
358
539
505
451
512
341
633
541
806
211
401
514
541
308
541
372

Growth
in profit
margin
-21%
-12%
-1%
0%
3%
18%
30%
275%
6041%
-64%
-50%
-23%
-7%
-5%
-5%
-1%
2%
2%
7%

10%
14%
18%
19%
20%
27%
32%
34%
43%
44%
46%
72%
188%
-129%
-107%
-28%
-23%
-14%
-2%
3%
26%
43%
45%
50%
58%
79%
-48%

Adjusted
growth in
margin
-34%
-21%
12%
13%
1%
31%
-26%
281%
5962%
-81%
-42%
-30%
-14%
-2%
-2%
-23%
-5%
14%
-1%
-1%
36%
41%
3%
12%
32%
41%
29%
59%
67%
39%
88%
210%
-108%
-16%
-15%
-21%
-56%
0%
9%
22%
45%
4%
53%
57%
81%
-47%

Table 3
Financial viability of leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990 in June 1993. Year
of buyout shown in parentheses.

No Financial Distress Experienced

Financial Distress Experienced

Borg Warner (1987)
Burlington Industries (1987)
International Controls (1987)
Joy Technologies (1987)
Owens-lllinois (1987)
AFG Industries (1988)
American Standard (1988)
Arkansas Best (1988)
Bell & Howell (1988)
DynCorp (1988)
Essex Group (1988)
Farm Fresh (1988)
Foodmaker (1988)
Fort Howard Corp (1988)
IBC Holdings (1988)
Musicland Stores (1988)
Payless Cashways (1988)
Stop & Shop (1988)
Supermarkets General (1988)
Tops Markets (1988)
York Holdings (1988)
Alco Health Services (1989)
Chicago & Northwestern (1989)
Cullum Cos (1989)
Horace Mann Educators (1989)
Hospital Corp of America (1989)
Kash n' Karry Food (1989)
Mayfair Supermarkets (1989)
NWA (1989)
RJR/Nabisco (1989)
Silgan Holdings (1989)
Super Rite Foods (1989)
General Instrument (1990)
Gulfstream Aerospace (1990)

Chapter 11
Pay N Pak (1987)
Revco Drug Stores (1987)
Southland (1987)
Tracor (1987)
Best Products (1988)
Charter Medical (1988)
Harvard Industries (1988)
Hillsborough Hldgs (1988)
Insilco (1988)
TWA (1988)
Envirodyne (1989)

Total Firms:

Workout
Florida Steel (1988)
Edgcomb (1989)

Total Firms: 13

34

16

Table 4

Status of leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990 in June 1993. Year of
transaction initiation is shown in parentheses.
Private equity only in 1993

Public equity by 1993

International Controls (1987)
Pay N' Pak (1987)
American Standard (1988)
Bell & Howell (1988)
Best Products (1988)
DynCorp (1988)
Essex Group (1988)
Farm Fresh (1988)
Fort Howard Corp. (1988)
Harvard Industries (1988)
Hillsborough Holdings (1988)
Insilco (1988)
Supermarkets General (1987)

Borg Warner (1987)
Burlington Industries (1987)
Joy Technologies (1987)
Owens-lllinois (1987)
Revco Drug Stores (1987)•
Southland (1987)-.b
Tracor (1987)•
AFG Industries (1988)
Arkansas Best (1988)
Charter Medical (1988)8
Florida Steel (1988)h
Foodmaker (1988)
IBC Holdings (1988)
Musicland Stores (1988)
Payless Cashways (1988)
Stop & Shop (1988)
Tops Markets (1988)
York Holdings (1988)
Chicago & Northwestern (1989)
Cullum Cos (1989)b
Edgcomb (1989)b
Horace Mann Educators (1989)
Hospital Corp. of America (1989)
Mayfair Supermarkets (1989)
RJR/Nabisco (1989)
Super Rite Foods (1989)
General Instruments (1990)
Gulfstream Aerospace (1990)

TWA (1988)

Alco Health Services (1989)
Envirodyne (1989)
Kash N' Karry Foods (1989)
NWA (1989)

Silgan Holdings (1989)

Total Firms:

19

Total Firms:

• Firm issued equity after filing for bankruptcy.
b Firm was sold to another public company Oto-Yokado has a majority interest in
Southland).

17

28

Table 5
Rates at which LBOs returned to public ownership between one and six years after transaction
initiation .. Censored firms are buyouts that are still private x years after the buyout and for
which data on year x + 1 are unavailable (e.g., 1988 buyouts become censored in year 6- 1994).

Year x

Number 'of
LBOs Private
at beginning of
year x

Number of
LBOs that
went public
in year x

Censored
firms

Cumulative
survival rate

Hazard rate

1

47

1

0

97.9

2.1

2

46

9

0

78.7

19.6

3

37

7

0

63.8

18.9

4

30

7

5

48.9

23.3

5

18

3

12

40.8

16.7

6

3

1

2

27.2

33.3
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Table 6
Highly leveraged transaction (HLT) loan exposure and performance among large U.S.
financial institutions as of December 31, 1991.

Bank

Assets
1991

HLTs
1991

Non performing
Fraction

Charge-offs
Fraction

HLT
Exposure

Citicorp

216,922

3,700

25.19%

3.70%

1.71%

Chemical Banking

138,930

5,500

13.38%

4.24%

3.96%

BankAmerica

115,509

1,795

19.00%

1.17%

1.55%

Nationsbank Corp

110,319

3,200

5.66%

1.25%

2.90%

JP Morgan

103,468

1,390

2.88%

NA

1.34%

Chase Manhattan

98,197

3,193

6.30%

2.07%

3.25%

Security Pacific

76,411

3,300

11.94%

3.08%

4.32%

Bankers Trust

63,959

2,300

26.04%

3.00%

3.60%

Wells Fargo

53,547

2,300

10.09%

5.57%

4.30%

First Chicago

48,963

2,700

3.67%

2.85%

5.51%

First Interstate Bancorp

48,922

433

11.32%

5.64%

0.89%

Bane One

46,293

407

3.93%

0.47%

0.88%

First Union Corp

46,085

1,169

9.58%

1.28%

2.54%

Fleet Norstar

45,445

638

7.21%

0.11%

1.40%

PNC Financial

44,892

1,672

4.90%

2.96%

3.72%

Norwest Corp

40,293

125

8.80%

0.00%

0.31%

Bank of New York

39,426

3,240

5.40%

5.37%

8.22%

Sun trust

32,797

363

0.00%

0.00%

1.11%

Barnett Banks

32,721

100

32.00%

14.00%

0.31%

Bank of Boston Corp

32,700

2,600

5.96%

1.92%

7.95%

First Fidelity Bancorp

30,215

381

10.47%

6.46%

1.26%

NBD Bancorp

29,513

247

23.08%

2.39%

0.84%

Mellon Bank Corp

29,355

1,405

1.99%

1.42%

4.79%

Continental Bank

24,008

1,682

12.78%

5.29%

7.01%

Average

66,892

2,027

10.59%

3.08%

3.11%
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